Electoral platform convergence is perceived unfavorably by both the popular press and many academic scholars. This paper provides a formal account of these perceived negative effects. We show that when parties do not know voters' preferences perfectly, voters prefer some platform divergence to the convergent policy outcome of competition between opportunistic, office-motivated, parties. We characterize when voters prefer responsible parties (which weight policy positively in their utility function) to opportunistic ones. Voters prefer responsible parties when office benefits and concentration of moderate voters are high enough relative to the ideological polarization between parties. In particular, with optimally-chosen office benefits, responsible parties improve welfare. * We thank Becky Morton and Joao Santos for valuable conversations. All mistakes are our own.
any theoretical explanation of the supposed negative effects of platform convergence. Indeed, under conventional assumptions, it is easy to draw the contrary welfare implication that policy convergence maximizes voter welfare. To elaborate, if voters have symmetric, single-peaked, risk-averse preferences, then they all prefer the known median policy to an election between two differentiated parties who win with equal probability and, hence, must be located symmetrically about the median policy. More generally, dropping symmetry, risk aversion alone implies that a majority of voters prefer convergence to the median to an election with two differentiated parties that produce an electoral tie. This insight extends to spatial models of electoral competition that derive policy divergence in equilibrium (e.g., the citizen-candidate models of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) or Besley and Coate (1997) ).
This note provides a formal account of the wide-spread unfavorable view of platform convergence and of claims that office-motivated parties do not provide voters with enough choice.
We show that in a model where voters' preferences are not perfectly known by parties, some divergence in platforms is beneficial to all voters. If there is slight dispersion in party platforms around the median of the distribution of the median voter, then each platform individually targets the median less accurately; but collectively, the platform closest to the realized position of the median voter is more accurate. Thus, the message of the Downsian model is fully reversed: Differentiated platforms raise voter welfare. To gain intuition for this result, consider a simple example where the median policy may take two values, −x and x, with equal probability. If the parties converge at the median of the distribution of medians, say 0, then the median voter incurs a loss independently of the median policy realization. Instead, if the left party chooses platform −x, and the right party chooses platform x, then the median voter can match the realized median policy with the appropriate party and achieve her bliss point. Our analysis extends this simple example to general distributions of voters exhibiting positive correlation across voter ideal points, and it shows that voters unanimously prefer some party platform dispersion.
Having concluded that some policy divergence unambiguously improves welfare, we give conditions under which the equilibrium policy outcome of competition between opportunistic parties (which are purely office-motivated) is worse than the outcome from responsible parties (which accrue some utility from policy) When the median policy is unknown, opportunistic parties' platforms converge to the median of the distribution of the median voter's position, as candidates fail to internalize the externality of providing voters choice. Responsible parties, in contrast, trade off the probability of winning the election against the policy realized in equilibrium, and they choose platforms closer to their preferred policies than the median of the median policy distribution-in equilibrium, they differentiate policies.
We identify conditions under which responsible parties provide voters higher ex-ante welfare than opportunistic parties by identifying when the distance between the parties' equilibrium platforms is positive but below a welfare-improving threshold. We show that the dispersion in equilibrium policies of responsible parties rises with the degree of ideological polarization and falls with the benefits from office and with the concentration of moderate voters. Indeed, if office benefits are too great or moderate voters are too concentrated, or parties are too ideologically similar, strategic incentives induce the parties to converge at the median of medians, replicating the equilibrium with opportunistic parties. Thus, the economies for which responsible parties are welfare improving are described by a two-dimensional set in the space of parameters: essentially, all voters prefer responsible parties when the degree of ideological polarization between the parties is not too great relative to the level of office benefit and the concentration of moderate voters. In particular, there is always a range of office benefits for which responsible parties improve welfare. Indeed, given any degree of ideological polarization between parties and concentration of moderate voters, there is a level of office benefits that maximizes ex-ante welfare for all voters; and provided parties are sufficiently polarized, the optimal assignment of office benefits can achieve the socially optimal level of platform dispersion. Further, the welfare-improving threshold of office benefits increases with uncertainty about the location of the median voter, reinforcing the case for responsible parties.
On the route to our welfare result, we give general conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the party location game, complementing the analyses of Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) . We also show that provided the separation between the parties' platforms is not too great, all voters benefit from increases in the degreee of ideological polarization between parties, decreases in the concentration of moderate voters, or decreases in office benefits.
We first consider the standard Downsian model, in which parties know the bliss point of the median voter, and show that a majority of voters are hurt by divergence from the median policy. The remainder of the paper addresses the situation in which parties are uncertain about the location of the median voter: In sharp contrast, voters unanimously prefer some divergence of party platforms, up to a welfare-improving threshold, to platforms that converge to the median of the distribution of the median voter's ideal policy. We later provide conditions under which the separation between the equilibrium policies of responsible parties respects this threshold and increases the ex ante welfare of all voters.
We suppose that voter preferences are described by symmetric and strictly concave utility functions defined on a one-dimensional space. A voter is indexed by her preferred policy θ, and when policy z is adopted, her utility is u(θ, z) = w(|θ − z|), where w is twice-differentiable, strictly decreasing, and strictly concave, i.e., w ′ < 0 and w ′′ < 0. Because a voter's preferences are symmetric around her bliss point, each voter votes for the party whose platform is closest to her preferred policy, voting for the parties with equal probabilities when indifferent (or when the parties choose the same platform). We initially assume that the median µ of the distribution over θ is known and, without loss of generality, normalized to zero.
Let W θ (x L , x R ) represent the expected welfare of voter θ when parties use strategies x L and x R , where without loss of generality, we assume that x L ≤ x R . We first compare the median convergent platforms, x L = 0 = x R , with any symmetric divergent platforms, x R = −x L = x > 0. Because platforms are symmetrically located around the median µ = 0, each party wins with probability 1/2. From risk aversion, we conclude that convergence to the median policy µ = 0 is optimal for all voters. That is, because w (|·|) is strictly concave,
Now suppose that departures from the median are asymmetric, i.e., that x L = −x R , and suppose without loss of generality that 0 < |x L | < |x R | . It follows that welfare is:
Then, by definition of the median, W θ (0, 0) > W θ (x L , x R ) for a strict majority of voters θ.
Obviously, if either
coincides with W θ (0, 0) . Summarizing, we have proved the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that parties know the median policy. Then compared to platforms that converge to the median policy, i.e., x L = x R = 0:
1. Any other platform pair (x L , x R ) symmetric around the median policy, i.e., with −x L = x R = x > 0, strictly reduces the expected utility of all voters.
2. Any asymmetric pair (x L , x R ) where neither party adopts the median policy, i.e., with
x L = 0 and x R = 0, strictly reduces the expected utility of a majority of voters.
3. Voter utility is unchanged by any pair where at least one party adopts the median policy.
In sum, platform divergence from a known median policy always hurts a majority of voters.
Henceforth, we consider a setting where the median voter is unknown to the parties. As is standard in the literature on Bayesian games, we model the location of the median voter as a random variable. We decompose the bliss point of a voter v as follows:
The term δ v is fixed and represents the ex-ante difference between the bliss point of voter v and the median. We assume that δ v is distributed symmetrically around zero across voters, with connected and bounded support. The term µ represents a common shock that shifts all voters' bliss points in the same way, and it is distributed with connected support according to the symmetric, continuously differentiable density f , i.e., f (−µ) = f (µ) for all µ, with the implication that f ′ (0) = 0 and, since the support of f is connected, f (0) > 0. Finally, ε v is an idiosyncratic shock that may change the position of voter v relative to the median. We assume that ε v is distributed independently of µ with connected support according to a symmetric density, g, so that g (ε v ) = −g (−ε v ) for all ε v . We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty in the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks ε v . Hence, the median of the ex-post distribution is µ with probability one, but the identities of the ex-ante and ex-post median voters differ with probability one.
Given platforms (x L , x R ), the ex-ante welfare of voter v is obtained by integrating over both the common shock µ to the electorate and the idiosyncratic shock ǫ v . Parties do not see these shocks prior to their choices of platforms. Therefore, their platforms are treated as fixed in the calculation of ex-ante welfare. As highlighted in the introduction, however, the outcome of the election does depend on preferences, as the winning party will be the party located closest to the realized median. The ex-ante welfare of voter
defined formally as follows:
If we view W v (−x, x) as a function of x, then it is the integral of strictly concave functions and is therefore itself strictly concave. We now show that voters unanimously prefer some differentiation of parties symmetrically around the median of medians.
Proposition 2 Assume that the median policy is unknown to the parties. Then there ex-
convergence at the median of medians, 0.
The appendix to the paper contains the proofs of Proposition ?? and other results not proved in the text.
The preceding result implies that when the median voter is unknown, platform convergence hurts all voters. In this case, convergent platforms cannot perfectly target the median policy, even if they converge to the median of the median policy distribution. Introducing slight dispersion in party platforms, individual platforms target the unknown median less accurately.
Collectively, however, the platform closest to the realized median can be more accurate than the median of the median policy distribution. If platform divergence is bounded above by the welfare-improving threshold,x, then divergence in fact increases voter welfare. Thus, the message of the Downsian model is fully reversed: Platform convergence hurts all voters.
We now determine conditions under which voters prefer responsible parties to opportunistic, purely office-motivated, parties. In equilibrium, opportunistic parties choose platform x = 0, the median of the distribution of median voters. We model responsible parties as having mixed policy and office motivations,à la Wittman (1984) or Calvert (1985) . For expositional simplicity, we restrict attention to parties L and R with symmetric bliss points −π and π, respectively, so that π > 0 measures the degree of ideological polarization between parties.
For simplicity, assume π/2 lies in the support of f . The party that wins office also receives a benefit b ∈ ℜ + ∪ {∞}. We focus on symmetric equilibria, with −x L = x R = x. Hence, if policy x is implemented, then the utility of party L is w (| − π − x|) if it loses the election and 
To guarantee that the equilibrium policy x increases in π, we assume
.
Note that (A2) is satisfied when utilities are quadratic, i.e., w(|x|) ≡ −|x| 2 .
Next, we characterize the equilibrium platforms of the game between the parties. Our result complements the analysis of Wittman (1983) , who considers candidates who maximize 3 This condition is satisfied if f is single-peaked and 1 − F is log concave on [0, π/2]. Then −f (µ)/(1 − F (µ)) is decreasing, which implies that the derivative has sign
a "weighted mandate" (p.151), and Calvert (1985) . Calvert (1985) establishes a continuity result for responsible parties, but does not give conditions for existence, uniqueness, nor characterize equilibrium for the case of mixed motives. We establish existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium. 4 We give a threshold level of office benefit, b = −w ′ (π)/f (0), such that if the benefits of office exceed the threshold, then convergence at the median of medians, 0, is sustained as the unique equilibrium, extending Calvert's (1985) result on "estimated medians" to the case of sufficiently high office benefits. More interestingly, when benefits lie below the threshold, the equilibrium is characterized by the first-order condition of the parties, allowing us to derive comparative statics on the parameters that describe the economy. Proposition 3 Under (A1), there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium (−x, x), and this
, and x > 0 is the unique solution to
. Adding (A2), if equilibrium platforms are interior, i.e., x ∈ (0, π) , then responsible parties adopt more extreme policy positions as (a) the ideological polarization π grows, (b) the density f (0) of the distribution of the median µ at zero falls, or (c) the benefits from holding office fall. That is, ∂x/∂π > 0, ∂x/∂f (0) < 0, and ∂x/∂b < 0.
A corollary establishes conditions under which the welfare of every voter is higher with responsible parties than with opportunistic parties, vindicating appeals for responsible parties.
From Proposition ??, there is a thresholdx such that if the symmetric equilibrium (−x, x) in the game between responsible parties satisfies 0 < x <x, then all voters prefer the divergent responsible party platforms to the convergent platforms offered by opportunistic parties. In particular, when b < −w ′ (π)/f (0), equilibrium is characterized by the first-order conditions, and the symmetric equilibrium satisfies x > 0. A straightforward continuity argument then yields how changes in the parameters decribing the economy affect the symmetric equilibrium policy choices. Since w ′ (π)/f (0) is negative, an implication is that there is always a non-degenerate range of office benefits for which responsible parties are beneficial. ??, using the chain rule, we therefore have
< 0, and
for all x ∈ [0, x * ) and all voters v. In particular, if the equilibrium dispersion of the parties' platforms is not too great, then a small increase in the level of polarization increases the divergence between equilibrium platforms and hence increases the welfare of all voters; while increases in the concentration of moderate voters or office benefits have the opposite effect.
We now conduct a more detailed welfare analysis by imposing a parametric form for the utility functions of voters and parties, allowing us to derive an expression for the maximal welfare-improving threshold from Proposition ?? and to completely characterize when responsible parties raise welfare. Specifically, we assume (A3) Voters and parties have quadratic utility, i.e., w(|x|) = −|x| 2 for all x.
The next lemma provides the foundations for the analysis, revealing that all voters share the same ex-ante ordering over platform pairs that are symmetric around the ex-ante median policy of zero, yielding unambiguous welfare comparisons. The result applies, in particular, to symmetric equilibria of the game between the parties.
Lemma 1 Under (A3), each voter v's expected utility from symmetric platform pairs (−x, x)
is a fixed amount δ 2 v less than the expected utility of the ex-ante median voter:
Hence, we can drop the subscript on W (·) when deriving the optimal dispersion in party platforms from the perspective of voters. The ex-ante median voter's welfare is
and differentiating with respect to x yields
Using mean-variance analysis, we can write
is an affine transformation of a quadratic function and is strictly concave as a function of x. We therefore have the following result. Proposition 5 Under (A1) and (A3), responsible parties provide higher welfare to all voters than opportunistic parties in equilibrium if and only if:
These results imply that the class of economies in which responsible parties increase voter welfare is described by a two-dimensional manifold of parameters (π, b, f (0)) such that
We can then explicitly calculate the parameter values under which responsible parties raise voter welfare. For example, suppose that 1 > 4f (0)E[µ|µ ≥ 0], so that the welfare comparison depends on the degree of polarization, π, and office benefits, b. Then for high enough π, we have 2π 4f (0)π+2 > 2E[µ|µ ≥ 0], and we can calculate the range of office benefits such that responsible parties increase voter welfare:
These insights also shed light on the issue of optimal institutional design: a propitious choice of office benefit of b =
can achieve exactly the socially-optimal policy locations from Proposition ??. Our analysis suggests, in this context, that office benefits should be higher when parties are more polarized, in order to induce platform moderation on the optimal policy, x = E [µ|µ ≥ 0].
Conclusion
The central prediction of spatial models of electoral competition is the median voter theorem.
However, platform convergence is unfavorably perceived by the popular press, and by many academic scholars. It is often argued that there is "not enough choice" between candidates (Committee on Political Parties (1950)). We provide a formal account of the supposed negative effects of platform convergence in a rational-choice theoretic setting. We show that in a model where voter preferences are not perfectly known, voters unanimously prefer some amount of platform divergence to the policy convergent outcome. Further, we give general conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the game between the parties, extending the analyses of Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) . We determine the conditions under which responsible parties provide all voters higher welfare than opportunistic parties-this occurs when the degree of ideological polarization is not too great relative to the level of office benefit and the concentration of moderate voters-and we present comparative statics on party platforms and voter welfare. Specifically, when the separation between the parties' platforms is not too great, the welfare of all voters increases with an increase in ideological polarization, a decrease in the concentration of moderate voters, or a decrease in the level of office benefit. Finally, we characterize the level of office benefits that maximize ex-ante voter welfare.
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition ??. Consider the welfare of any voter v with parameter δ:
Differentiating with respect to x, yields
Hence, because we integrate over the positive reals, µ > 0, there are three cases:
and
Case 3: µ−δ−ε < 0 and −µ−δ−ε < 0. Then |−µ − δ − ε| > |µ − δ − ε| , because µ > 0,
In all cases, w ′ < 0 and w ′′ < 0 imply γ (0, µ, ε) > 0.
Let ∆ be a compact set containing δ v for all voters v. We have shown that
is uniquely defined, and therefore arg max x W δ (−x, x) > 0 for all δ. By the theorem of the maximum, arg max x W δ (−x, x) is continuous in δ, and therefore it attains a minimum, x * > 0, on the compact set ∆. Given δ ∈ ∆, concavity of
for all x ∈ (0, x * ]. Therefore, for all v and all x ∈ (0,
Proof of Proposition ??. Given locations x L < x R , party R wins the election whenever
R wins with probability one half, creating a payoff discontinuity. Suppose that L chooses a location −x < 0. Because π ≥ 0, i.e., the bliss point of R is positive, party R will never choose a location x R < −x. Hence, party R maximizes:
which is differentiable whenever −x < x R or −x = x R = 0. Differentiating, we obtain:
We first establish that the platform x R maximizing U (−x, x R ) is such that x R ≤ π. In case x R > π, define x ′ = min{x, π}, and note that F ([−x + x R ]/2) ≤ 1/2 and
Further, w(π − x ′ ) + b > w(x + π), and either
, so x R is not a maximizer, as claimed.
We now show that given x ∈ [0, π], there is at most one solution to the first-order condition 
Rewriting the first derivative as
we substitute the first-order condition into the second derivative to obtain
where the last inequality follows from (A1). We have shown that every solution to the firstorder condition satisfies the second-order sufficient condition for a strict local maximizer.
Therefore, by continuity, the solutions are locally isolated. Consider any such solution x 1 , and if x 1 is not unique, suppose there is a solution greater than x 1 ; in particular, let x 2 be the next solution, i.e., if y solves (??) and y < x 2 , then y ≤ x 1 . Assume without loss of generality that U(−x, x 1 ) ≥ U(−x, x 2 ). Since x 2 is a strict local maximizer, it follows that min{U(−x, y) | y ≥ [x 1 , x 2 ]} < U(−x, x 2 ). But then this minimum must be achieved at some y ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ), and y must solve the first-order condition, a contradiction. If there is a solution to the first-order condition, then a similar argument implies that it is the unique maximizer, as claimed.
It follows that given x ∈ [0, π], there is a unique best response r(x) in [0, π] for party R.
Indeed, if z and z ′ are distinct best responses, then z, z ′ ∈ {0, π}, for if z ∈ (0, π), then z satisfies the first order condition and, by the above argument, is the unique best response for party R. Thus, 0 and π are both best responses. Then U(−x, ·) achieves a minimum, say z * , on [0, π], but then z * satisfies the first order condition and is the unique best response, a contradiction. That the mapping r : [−π, π] → [−π, π] so-defined is continuous follows directly from an application of the theorem of the maximum. By Brower's theorem, r admits a fixed point, and we claim that (−x, x) is a symmetric equilibrium. By symmetry of the parties, it is immediate that −x is a best response to x for party L in [−π, 0]. It remains to be shown that party R cannot deviate profitably to a platform y such that −x ≤ y < 0. We have argued that r(x) is the unique best response in (−x, π], so we need only verify that y = −x is not profitable. Consider the sequence {y n } defined by y n = y + 
